Book Review of "Searching for a Solution to Suffering"

The following is a review of my book on theodicy, Searching for a Solution to Suffering, by my friend and fellow theological autodidact David Pallmann. Though the review was written back in the Summer of 2021, I felt it would be helpful to archive it here for reference. 

Thanks again to David for his generous and honest thoughts.

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An Arminian - Annihilationist Review of Searching for a Solution to Suffering by Caleb Jackson

My friend Caleb Jackson was so kind as to send me a copy of his recent book on the problem of evil (POE). Although the book is intended as a Christian theodicy, it covers a much wider range of topics including soteriology, Christology, divine hiddenness, hell, and the atonement. Inasmuch as Jackson is writing a popular level book, I will treat it in this way. Although the book is written to a popular audience, it is quite comprehensive in terms of the amount of territory it covers related to the POE. I am impressed by the amount of study that must have gone into it. Jackson is a good writer and makes his points in an articulate and clear manner. I must also make a disclaimer: I am not an expert in the area of theodicy or the POE. I am approaching this review as someone who still has much to learn.

Jackson opens chapter 1 by posing the metaphysical question of what good and evil are. This is actually quite an interesting question and, as far as I can tell, it is never actually answered in the book. Jackson uses this as a springboard to transition into building his moral argument for God. I was a little surprised that with so many philosophical moral arguments to choose from, Jackson decided to utilize William Lane Craig's version. Craig's version is, in my opinion, much too simplistic since it doesn't offer any reason to link God to morality.

Jackson's defense of the argument has both strong points and weaker points. Some concerns include his periodic conflation of materialism and atheism. When arguing against atheism's capacity to ground moral truths, he constantly appeals to the inability of morals to be grounded in matter. But I don't think atheism is necessarily committed to materialism (although certainly many atheists are materialists). He also tends to assume a libertarian definition of freedom. And while I agree with him, compatibilists will likely think this to be question begging.

When offering an account for why the ground of morality must be God, Jackson attributes many attributes to the explanation. Most of them, I think, are correct. But I'm not sure if he is correct to say that it must be personal. His justification is that the explanation must be able to explain the "oughtness" of morality. But I'm not sure why a Platonic sort of account of moral truths wouldn't suffice here. Admittedly this seems more contrived than theism. But I don't think we can say that it is impossible.

When arguing for the reality of moral truths, Jackson argued that one cannot live without acting as though there is such a thing as objective morality. But I don't think that entails that objective morality is true. Evolution could explain why we are constrained to act in certain ways. Likewise he appeals to the idea that moral beliefs are properly basic and therefore in need of no further justification. But properly basic beliefs still need justification. That justification won't come in the form of other beliefs. But that doesn't make them arbitrary. Towards the end Jackson gives an excellent critique of theories of morality which try to explain it by reference to social conditioning.

Chapter 2 sets the stage for responding to the problem of evil. Jackson carefully lays out the many layers of the problem and briefly explains how he plans to tackle them. The chapter is both clear and helpful.

Chapter 3 introduces the free will defense. Jackson spends a lot of time discussing biblical texts relevant to the nature of free will. Initially this may seem a little out of place, but recalling that the book is specifically presenting a Christian theodicy, I think Jackson's deference to biblical texts is warranted. He gives some criticisms of compatibilist accounts of free will, and proceeds to offer arguments for a libertarian account. Unfortunately I found the biblical sections of the argument to border on proof texting. There was very little discussion about how compatibilists understand the texts Jackson used in support of libertarianism. But I suppose that probably went beyond the purview of the book. I was surprised that there was no mention on 1 Corinthians 10:13 which, in my opinion, is one of the clearest text in favor of libertarian free will. Finally Jackson explores the problem of whether or not there will be free will in heaven. He concludes that there will be, and I found his case to be quite compelling in this regard.

Chapter 4 applies the free will defense to the problem of natural evil. Jackson begins by discussing Lapsarianism, the idea that the fall of man as recorded in Genesis 3 is natural evils can be explained by reference to man's free will. I must admit that I am a little surprised that Jackson had a favorable view of this solution. The most glaring problem facing this idea is that God does not seem justified in removing everyone's immunity to evil on the basis of Adam and Eve having sinned. Why should we all suffer for what others did when this suffering is not a direct result of their sin, but rather a permanent curse on the earth? I don't think Jackson addressed this problem.

Jackson turns to consider Swinburne's suggestion that natural evil is needed in order for people to have knowledge of what is good. Now this is an interesting argument that I haven't fully decided upon. However, Jackson finds it to be fatally flawed since God could intervene and remove evil by means of miracles. I am less impressed by this objection than Jackson is. If we allow that natural evil is necessary in order for people to have knowledge of good and evil, then obviously God won't intervene. The objection seems entirely misplaced to me. Furthermore, Jackson does not appear to appreciate the devastating epistemic consequences that would follow if God did miracles in order to prevent every instance of evil. If miracles were commonplace, they would lose their evidential power and be mistaken for ordinary events. I was also a bit surprised that Jackson did not discuss the possible soteriological benefits that natural evil may bring about in this chapter (although he does in the next). I personally find this possibility intriguing.

Chapter 5 kicks off part two of the book. I think that the most outstanding feature of this chapter is Jackson's defense of consequentialism. I actually thought he made a rather good case that consequentialism is not necessarily a bad thing.

Chapter 6 discusses a theodicy which was entirely new to me, what Jackson calls the Felix Culpa theodicy. According to this theory, the evils in the world were necessary for the history of salvation to unfold and that this history is required for our world to be the best possible world. The chapter contains an excellent argument for an orthodox kenotic model of the incarnation (although Jackson never uses that term). When discussing the atonement, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint which theory of the atonement Jackson holds. Much of what he says sounds like he accepts the penal substitutionary theory (even referencing Craig's book on the topic), but in a later chapter he proceeds to critique penal substitution.

In chapter 7, Jackson moves to explore the problem of animal suffering. I think he is too quick to dismiss Trent Dougherty's solution (although towards the end of the chapter he expresses some sympathy towards a similar solution). When discussing how one's view on biological evolution impacts one's theodicy, Jackson correctly points out that rejection of biological evolution doesn't solve the problem. However, I think he overlooks the fact that rejection of biological evolution does make the task much easier, for now we needn't explain why there were millions of years of (seemingly) pointless suffering.

Jackson ultimately lands on a theodicy according to which evolutionary history complete with suffering illustrates or foreshadows salvation history. I'm not completely satisfied with this account. Imagine a painter who butchers helpless animals so that he can use their blood to paint beautiful pictures. I doubt anyone would say that the beautiful picture justifies the horrifying violence. True, the suffering isn't any longer pointless in the broadest sense of the word. But it still seems unnecessary. I'm hard pressed to see how Jackson's proposal significantly differs from this illustration.

In chapter 8, Jackson builds a case for universalism. However, I didn't find the biblical texts which he utilized to justify this conclusion. For example, he used texts like John 3:16 and 1 Timothy 2:4 which state that God wants everyone to be saved. But it doesn't follow from the fact that God desires that all be saved that all will be saved. Jackson also uses 1 Corinthians 15:22, which says that as in Adam all die even so in Christ will all be made alive. He argues that because the word "all" is parallel in both instances, it must refer to the same group. However that doesn't work if we understand how Paul uses the phrase "in Christ." Paul uses this to refer to the metaphorical location of believers. Christ is a corporate head who stands in contrast to Adam. Thus, we may read Paul as saying that all who are in Adam die just as all who are in Christ will be made alive. Similarly he uses Romans 11:32, where it says that God bound all in disobedience that He might have mercy on all. But contextually this refers to the people of Israel who, as Paul has explained in chapters 9-11, are being judicially hardened by God. Of course the point about God's mercy can be extended to all the world. But notice that Paul says that this was so that God *may have* mercy on all. This appears to be a statement about God making mercy available to all. But it doesn't suggest that all will be recipients of that mercy. Likewise he uses 1 John 2:2. But this verse only affirms that Christ died for the world. It doesn't say that the world will benefit from His death. And again, 1 Timothy 4:10 states that God is the Savior of all men and especially believers. Paul makes an obvious distinction between how God is the Savior of believers and unbelievers. I would suggest that the difference lies in who is actually saved. Philippians 2:10-11 says every knee will bow and every tongue will confess. But the context is about the supremacy of Christ. Paul isn't discussing soteriology. He certainly doesn't say that this confession is voluntary or salvific.

I also found it interesting that a text like Matthew 7:14 which plainly says that the way that leads to life is narrow and only a few find it was not discussed. Additionally Hebrews 6:4-6 which seems to say that apostates can never be saved again received no attention. I understand that this probably went beyond the scope of the book.

I thoroughly enjoyed the diatribe against Calvinism. However, I was disappointed in Jackson's treatment of Arminianism. First, and this is a rather minor quibble, he cites Dave Hunt as a proponent of Arminianism. This is not true. Hunt didn't identify as such and Arminians don't claim him. Moreover he greatly misrepresents Arminius in his books.

The really unfortunate part was Jackson's claim that Arminians don't believe that God is able to save everyone and that they deny God's sovereignty. This is completely false. No Arminian claims that God is unable to unconditionally save everyone if He wanted to. It is precisely because we believe that God desires all to freely meet the condition of faith, that He does not save all. God wants to save all, but not unconditionally. God wants everyone to meet the condition of faith, but will only actually save those who do. God doesn't have to do it this way. He surely could save anyone even those who don't believe. But Scripture doesn't teach this. Scripture reveals that God has chosen to save those who believe and that He wants all to believe.

Jackson concludes that Arminians must believe that God is unable to save a on the basis of the following argument:

1. God desires that all men shall be saved

2. God is omnipotent and has the ability to save everyone

3. Therefore, all people are saved

Overall Jackson's book is quite impressive in terms of discussing a wide range of topics. I think the sections pertinent to the POE were, for the most part, well done. I think that the discussion on tertiary issues like soteriology and eschatology could have been much better. But these were not the main issues that Jackson wanted to write about. Once again, this is not my area of expertise. These are just my honest thoughts as an interested layperson.

He concludes that Arminians must deny premise 2. But that's not the case at all. We would simply point out that the conclusion does not follow unless you add the premise that God unconditionally saves everyone he wants to save. This is the unspoken premise that the Arminian disputes.

Jackson also offers three biblical texts which he thinks challenge Arminianism: John 15:16, 2 Timothy 1:9, and Romans 9:16. In John 15:16, Jesus says that you did not choose me but I chose you. However, as John Calvin himself observed, this text is not about election to salvation but rather the choosing of the disciples to go and bring forth fruit (ie converts). It doesn't negate the fact that election unto salvation requires faith. 2 Timothy 1:9 says that we weren't saved on the basis of works. Arminians agree. We believe that faith, not works, is the condition for election. Finally, Romans 9:16 says that it doesn't depend on him that runs or him that wills. The crucial question, of course, is what does "it" refer to. Arminians have traditionally understood this to refer to the ground of salvation (grace through faith) although many scholars take this to be a simple reference to works of the law. Either way, it doesn't challenge Arminianism.

I also want to address Jackson's repeated claim that Arminians don't believe that God ever overrides human freedom. This is also false. We believe God can and does. We just don't think that He normally does this or that He does this in regard to salvation.

I also need to correct some of Jackson's claims about annihilationism. He claims that annihilationists don't believe in eternal punishment. This is false. Annihilationists do believe in eternal punishment (death) they just don't believe in eternal torment. He also seems to think that annihilationists believe that people are instantly annihilated at death. I am shocked by this claim especially given the sources that Jackson cites as books arguing for annihilationism. Surely if he read these books he knows that very few annihilationists believe that there is no judgment after death. Annihilationists don't dispute the reality of conscience torment, they just dispute the duration of it.

The final chapter of the book ties up some loose ends. Jackson addresses the issues of skeptical theism, divine hiddenness, and religious disagreement. The book ends by walking the reader through the sinner's prayer.

Overall Jackson's book is quite impressive in terms of discussing a wide range of topics. I think the sections pertinent to the POE were, for the most part, well done. I think that the discussion on tertiary issues like soteriology and eschatology could have been much better. But these were not the main issues that Jackson wanted to write about. Once again, this is not my area of expertise. These are just my honest thoughts as an interested layperson.