Was Paul a Roman Citizen? A Response to the Amateur Exegete and Calvin Roetzel

Ben the Amateur Exegete (henceforth AE) is an atheist who produces content on historical biblical scholarship. He recently put out a video challenging the report in Acts 16:37 and Acts 22:22-29 of Paul's Roman citizenship. To his credit, AE doesn't think the objections are conclusive and concedes that Paul certainly could have possessed Roman citizenship. However, he argues that the balance of evidence suggests that Luke "padded Paul's resume". AE draws his arguments from Calvin Roetzel's 1999 book Paul: The Man and the Myth, so I will be responding to that text. Drawing on the work of Craig Keener, Martin Hengel, and others, this post will critique the arguments of Roetzel, and, by extension, those of AE. It is not a definitive treatment of the subject, and I will not be providing a separate positive case for Paul's Roman citizenship as other scholars like Keener have done.

Though these are not the only objections that have been raised to Paul's Roman citizenship, they are certainly some of the more common ones. I will address only the four listed by Roetzel.

Roman citizenship and the elite

Roetzel's first objection concerns whether it is plausible to think that Paul would have had Roman citizenship given the socioeconomic situation of the time. Here is the full quotation from his book:

"The granting of citizenship to Jews in the East was rare, and on those infrequent occasions when it was granted it usually went to wealthy and influential people who had performed distinguished service to Rome. To be sure, we do know of Jews who aspired to and were granted citizenship. Philo tells us of his nephew Tiberias Julius Alexander, who became a citizen of Alexandria and a Roman equestrian and rose to a position of power and influence. But he was singled out by Josephus for deserting the traditions of the fathers. The physical evidence supports the view that only a few Jews who were wealthy, powerful, and profoundly attracted to Hellenistic and Roman culture became citizens. In a survey of the epigraphical evidence Stegeman finds only 552 residents of Asia Minor who were citizens. We know of no citizens in Pergamum in the time of Augustus, and interestingly only 3 of 103 names from Ephesus contain the name of Julius, a probable indicator of citizenship. All of the evidence suggests that citizenship status was rarely granted in the eastern provinces." [1]

Before challenging Roetzel's arguments, I would like to draw attention to an epistemological point: even if Roman citizenship was rare, the fact that it did happen on occasion sets a prior not so unreasonably low that it cannot be overcome by testimony to the contrary. If it is true that Luke was a traveling companion of Paul (a hypothesis for which there is very strong evidence) then Luke was in a position to know whether Paul was a Roman citizen. Further, if it can be demonstrated that Luke was a meticulous historian, we are on solid footing in accepting his report of Paul's Roman citizenship. Even though it might be prima facie implausible that Paul was a Roman citizen, Luke's testimony that he was provides strong evidence for that proposition. Testimonial evidence can easily overcome a somewhat low prior.

To appreciate this point, consider a situation in which a neighbor you have recently met (and thus, whose backstory you know little of) tells you that they were in attendance for the famous "Minneapolis Miracle"—the 2018 NFL divisional playoff game between the Vikings and the Saints which ended with a walk-off 61-yard touchdown reception. There were 66,612 people in attendance at this game [2] and there are currently some 333 million people living in the United States. [3] Thus, bypassing minor considerations such as change in population, the probability that an individual randomly selected from the US population went to that game is roughly 0.02%. If we instead restrict the reference class to citizens of Minnesota, where the game was played, we come up with a prior of about 1.2%. [4] The exact number is unimportant, but it can clearly be shown to be quite low. 

Now, when your neighbor tells you that they attended this game, how confident are you that they are telling the truth? For me, even living in Florida, I think I would assign at least a 20% confidence level to the claim. It would likely be higher, but I will use conservative estimates. Using the rules of probability theory, this means that, in my subjective judgment, the testimony from my neighbor yields a Bayes factor of over 1000 in confirming the hypothesis that they were at the game. If I had as part of my background knowledge the fact that they were habitually trustworthy and had an interest in telling the truth, my confidence level would easily go over 50%. Further, if they told me a plausible story about their time at the game, I would be even more confident that they are telling the truth. Perhaps the reader would assign a higher or lower probability to the hypothesis after this evidence is taken into account than I did. But so long as the posterior probability isn't too low, the principle is clear: simple testimony can overcome low priors with relative ease.

The critic may quibble with some of the parallels I have drawn, and I have not intended to make this situation a perfect epistemological match. But the similarities are far more instructive. In both cases we have a proposition with a fairly low prior probability (though the probability of a given Jew possessing Roman citizenship was likely well above 0.02%) combined with testimony in favor of that proposition. Just like in the neighbor example, Luke, I would argue, was both in a position to know whether what he was saying was true and had an ostensible interest in telling the truth. As long as the prior is not too unreasonably low, Luke's testimony provides strong evidence for the proposition that Paul was a Roman citizen.

This observation aids in defusing some objections to Luke's testimony. One might argue that, given the significance of Roman citizenship, Luke would have had motivation to lie. This might be correct, but it applies similarly to a claim to have attended the Minneapolis Miracle. While one might be motivated to lie about having attended such a significant game, their testimony is still much more likely to be expected if they did attend the game then if they didn't.

Putting it in another light, I think in most cases it is far more epistemologically defensible to prioritize specific evidence for a historical proposition (e.g. Luke's testimony of Paul's citizenship) rather than general patterns of evidence which have exceptions (e.g. the rarity of Jewish Roman citizens). If we fail to do this, we might slip into a priori history in which we determine ahead of time what would or would not be the case and reject reliable, informed sources that go against it instead of questioning the initial presuppositions.

Regarding the claim itself that Roman citizens were rare, Craig Keener comments:

"Though citizens were a small minority, they were much more common than Stegemann allows; they could achieve their citizenship by manumission, assisting a general, and various other means (see comment on Acts 22:28). Thus inscriptions report even “fishermen” in Ephesus who were citizens. Moreover, nonelite persons could readily become citizens by various means—most relevant here, descent from properly manumitted slaves of citizens, a category that included a number of Roman Jews." [5]

Stegemann's reading of the epigraphical evidence has likewise been challenged. Here's Keener again:

"Stegemann doubts that Paul and his father, as Jews, could belong to the municipal elite, for whom (he thinks) citizenship was reserved. He claims, for example, only three Julii from Ephesian inscriptions of the Augustan period and only twenty from all first-century inscriptions. In his thorough dissertation focusing on Ephesian inscriptions and Paul, however, Steven Baugh demonstrates that Stegemann misreads the evidence. The Julii on later inscriptions were most likely descended from Ephesians who were granted the franchise under Julius or Augustus. He points out that of the 1,173 Roman citizens who appear in Ephesian inscriptions, 429 of them bear nomens of patrons other than emperors." [6]

In other words, the fact that an inscription doesn't bear the name of an emperor is little reason to doubt that the individual was a Roman citizen, so the rarity of Roman citizens cannot be established by that fact.

To summarize, it appears that Roman citizenship was certainly uncommon, and this explains why the military tribune of Acts 22 simply assumed that Paul did not possess it. But Roman citizenship was not so uncommon that Paul couldn't have had it, and it is simply false to say that only the wealthy and influential Jewish individuals were Roman citizens. When we consider the evidential weight of testimony, Roetzel's first objection is thus insufficient to overturn Luke's account that Paul was a Roman citizen.

Roman citizenship and pagan cultic devotion

Roetzel's second objection is as follows: 

"If Paul's piety reflects that of his parents, the piety of his home would argue against Roman citizenship. A condition of citizenship was participation in the civic cult, offering of obeisance to the gods of the city, sharing in the festivals of the polis, which were by definition religious, and offering homage to the Roman gods and allegiance to the imperial cult. Paul's own deep religious commitments as a pious Jew would certainly have conflicted with those obligations. Paul himself tells us with some pride of his blamelessness before the law (Phil. 3:6), that he advanced in Judaism "beyond many among my people of the same age, for I was far more zealous for the traditions of my ancestors" (Gal. 1:14), and that the same zeal led him to persecute the church (Phil 3:6). A Jew of such intense devotion to the ancestral traditions would have found it impossible to share in the religion of the Graeco-Roman world or to participate in its educational institution, the gymnasium. There is no sign in the letters that Paul was a student of the Greek classics or that he had been exposed to the exercise regimen, including exercise in the nude, associated with a gymnasium education." [7]

For an assessment of this claim, let us turn first to Martin Hengel:

"According to Philo's well-known report, which has to be taken very seriously by historians, the majority of Jews living in Rome were Roman citizens. Having been carried off to Italy as prisoners of war, in due course they were freed by their owners who 'did not compel them to corrupt their ancestral laws'. Augustus, on being given precise information about their religious practices, 'did not expel them from Rome nor deprive them of Roman citizen rights because they were concerned to keep their Jewish faith'...

As a rule they were exempt from military service, though it must be stressed here that in the late Republic and the period of the early Empire the Roman army was made up of volunteers. Notice was taken of religious peculiarities in a variety of other ways. Unless he held office, a Jew, whether a Roman citizen or not, did not have to perform any religious actions in connection with the emperor cult, either in Rome or in the Greek-speaking East, where the emperor cult flourished more strongly after the period of the Hellenistic monarchies than in the capital itself." [8]

Further contrary opinion comes from Keener:

"Third, Stegemann doubts that Jews such as Paul could be Roman citizens, because most locales would require Roman citizens' participation in pagan practices. But Baugh points to Ephesian inscriptions that reveal “Jews with Roman names and local citizenship fully participating in the lives of their cities.” Josephus attests numerous Jewish Roman citizens. Inscriptions show Jewish Roman citizens with significant roles in the Diaspora (especially in synagogues); many religious Jews found their Roman honor compatible with their Jewish practice. Many freed Jewish slaves were Roman citizens in Rome itself; we know of an entire community of Jewish Roman citizens across the Tiber (Philo Embassy 155–57). Although faithful Jews were never enrolled in Greek tribes, which entailed religious obligations, the Roman tribes were simply political and legal fictions by this period. In short, Jewish Roman citizens retained the privileges held by all Jews under Roman policy." [9] 

Finally, one wonders what to make of Roetzel's final comment, that there is no evidence in Paul's letters that he had been exposed to exercising in the nude. Even granting that it must have happened, what possible evidence of this would we expect? Throwing out things that were typical of Roman citizens and then noting that we don't have this evidence for Paul, even when there's no reason to expect find such evidence, is bad method.

Due to the evidence we have for Jewish Roman citizens, and specifically the exemptions they were able to acquire in relation to their religiosity, we have good reason to doubt Roetzel's second objection.

Roman citizenship and a Pauline argumentio ex silentio

Proceeding to Roetzel's third objection, we read the following:

"Certain omissions in the letters argue against citizenship. If Paul were a Roman citizen his endurance of oppression so severe that he despaired of life itself (2 Cor 1:8, 9f) is difficult to understand when an appeal to his Roman citizenship offered a ready escape. The omission of any mention of his Roman citizenship in his reference to his new heavenly citizenship is also puzzling (Phil. 3:20). It would also have been useful for him to have noted the ironic contrast between his citizen status and his condition as the "off scouring of the world" (my trans.) in 1 Cor. 4:13, but again he was silent. But, more importantly, Paul's failure to refer to his citizenship in his letter to the church at Rome is perplexing. While an argumentio ex silentio when taken alone is hardly convincing, when added to the other evidence noted previously it weighs against Roman citizenship." [10]

Much has been said about the weakness of the argument from silence. I wrote a post earlier this year discussing it. While Roetzel's admission of the potential weaknesses of this argument is to be commended, I still think he gives it too much weight. Regarding the first point about Paul willingly suffering despite his Roman citizenship, Craig Keener comments:

"This objection is stronger than some of the others. Yet this experience of beating need count against Paul’s citizenship no more than Luke’s claim that he was beaten with rods in Acts; if Luke, who understood the value of Roman citizenship against such abuse (Acts 16:37–38), saw no contradiction, it is possible that Paul would not have seen any either." [11]

Unless one wants to argue that Luke was incompetent and didn't see the contradiction, this point holds. If one does opt for this attempt at keeping the objection alive, it can be said that lack of attention to detail on Luke's part does not sit well either with his care and meticulousness elsewhere in his work or with the picture of Luke Roetzel suggests in his fourth objection, yet to be addressed, in which Luke embeds Paul's Roman citizenship into his narrative in order to make a subtle theological point. A simple explanation is that Paul sometimes endured suffering without invoking his citizenship, perhaps to identify with his Lord.

The next point at which Roetzel expects a mention of Paul's Roman citizenship is Philippians 3:20. Here is Philippians 3:18-21 (NRSV):

"For many live as enemies of the cross of Christ; I have often told you of them, and now I tell you even with tears. Their end is destruction; their god is the belly; and their glory is in their shame; their minds are set on earthly things. But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself."

Since Paul is talking about the collective heavenly citizenship of the Philippian church, it would make little sense for him to appeal to his personal Roman citizenship which not everybody in Philippi would share. After all, Paul is not saying that his citizenship is in heaven, but rather "our" (Greek ἡμῶν) citizenship is in heaven. Thus, contra Roetzel, I see no reason to think Paul would have mentioned his citizenship here.

The next verse Roetzel cites is 1 Corinthians 4:13: "when slandered, we speak kindly. We have become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day." Specifically, he says that it would have been "useful" for Paul to note the "the ironic contrast" between his Roman citizenship and his condition as described in the verse. This is a transparently feeble argument. Roetzel has come up with a rhetorical device that he personally finds useful, and coupled with the unsupported assumption that Paul also would have found this device useful for his purposes, leaps to the conclusion that Paul must not have agreed with the content of the rhetorical device he didn't use. There are many rhetorical contrasts I could draw when writing a post like this, but my failure to include all of them doesn't mean I disagree with the item I could have contrasted. 

Roetzel's final suggestion for where Paul should have mentioned his Roman citizenship is in his letter to the church in Rome. This is more probable than any of the three previous suggestions, but it is still tenuous. If I lived overseas for several years and wrote a letter to a church back home, it is not clear that I would mention my US citizenship. In the same way, the purpose of Paul's epistle was not to inform the Roman church of his own legal standing but to address specific theological issues. 

Thus, we may conclude that Roetzel's third objection also fails. 

Roman citizenship and Luke's narrative theology

That Luke has a complex narrative theology in various parts of his work is plausible. [12] This does not mean, however, that every subtle meaning we think can be discerned from his writing was intentional. With his fourth objection, Roetzel would do well to take note of this:

"Paul's citizenship clearly served Luke's theological interests. By insisting on Paul's faithfulness to Judaism as a loyal Pharisee until the day of his death and his Roman citizenship Luke was able to argue for Paul's respectability and innocence at a time when the Christian movement had come under suspicion for its unwillingness to participate in the imperial cult, its refusal to serve in the military, its pacificistic lifestyle, and its secret meetings. By lifting up Paul as a respected and loyal citizen Luke could show that the movement he represented was innocent of treason or subversive activity." [13]

Prima facie, the fact that a particular aspect of the narrative of Acts may have served Luke's theological interests means nothing. A pastor will often share an anecdote from his life in order to illustrate a point in his sermon. Sometimes, this anecdote fits the context very neatly, but we don't then assume that he's making it up. Rather, he's selecting something from his many experiences to make a broader point. So even if Luke is trying to make the argument that Roetzel attributes to him, it counts little against historicity.  

Whether Luke is actually trying to exonerate the Christian movement is a different question, and one to which historical inquiry can offer little light. There are too many assumptions at play. But even granting this to be what Luke was trying to do, it is quite plausible that he would emphasize Paul's citizenship rather than inventing it. He could easily accomplish his objective by framing existing facts rather than inventing new ones. Thus, Roetzel's fourth and final objection fails, and his case against Paul's Roman citizenship falls with it.

Conclusion

Calvin Roetzel presented four arguments against Paul's Roman citizenship, each of which were picked up on by AE. These four arguments were each revealed to have significant flaws. 

While Roman citizenship was rare, it was not so rare that Paul could not have possessed it, and Luke's testimony that he did is sufficiently powerful to overturn a low prior probability. It is unlikely that Jewish Roman citizens would have been required to participate in the pagan cultic rites in which other Roman citizens participated, given the evidence for the prevalence of Jewish Roman citizens and the exemptions that were granted in other contexts. Finally, Roetzel fails to make a successful argument from silence, and his argument from Luke's narrative interests lacks rigor. 

A positive case for Paul's Roman citizenship may be the subject of a future post. The weakness of the arguments against it, however, leaves us with little reason to doubt the fundamental accuracy of Luke's account.

Notes and References

[1] Calvin Roetzel, Paul: The Man and the Myth (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 20

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minneapolis_Miracle 

[3] https://www.census.gov/popclock/

[4] https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/MN/PST045221 

[5] Craig Keener, Acts: An Exegetical Commentary, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015). Due to restricted availability, I am unable to provide page numbers for my citations of Keener's work. All of them come from his discussion of Acts 16:37.

[6] ibid.

[7] Roetzel, Paul, 20-21

[8] Martin Hengel, The Pre-Christian Paul (London: SCM Press, 1991), 11-12

[9] Keener, Acts

[10] Roetzel, Paul, 12

[11] Keener, Acts

[12] See, for example, C. Kavin Rowe, “Acts 2.36 and the Continuity of Lukan Christology,” NTS (2007): 37–56

[13] Roetzel, Paul, 12

Book Review of "Searching for a Solution to Suffering"

The following is a review of my book on theodicy, Searching for a Solution to Suffering, by my friend and fellow theological autodidact David Pallmann. Though the review was written back in the Summer of 2021, I felt it would be helpful to archive it here for reference. 

Thanks again to David for his generous and honest thoughts.

..............................................

An Arminian - Annihilationist Review of Searching for a Solution to Suffering by Caleb Jackson

My friend Caleb Jackson was so kind as to send me a copy of his recent book on the problem of evil (POE). Although the book is intended as a Christian theodicy, it covers a much wider range of topics including soteriology, Christology, divine hiddenness, hell, and the atonement. Inasmuch as Jackson is writing a popular level book, I will treat it in this way. Although the book is written to a popular audience, it is quite comprehensive in terms of the amount of territory it covers related to the POE. I am impressed by the amount of study that must have gone into it. Jackson is a good writer and makes his points in an articulate and clear manner. I must also make a disclaimer: I am not an expert in the area of theodicy or the POE. I am approaching this review as someone who still has much to learn.

Jackson opens chapter 1 by posing the metaphysical question of what good and evil are. This is actually quite an interesting question and, as far as I can tell, it is never actually answered in the book. Jackson uses this as a springboard to transition into building his moral argument for God. I was a little surprised that with so many philosophical moral arguments to choose from, Jackson decided to utilize William Lane Craig's version. Craig's version is, in my opinion, much too simplistic since it doesn't offer any reason to link God to morality.

Jackson's defense of the argument has both strong points and weaker points. Some concerns include his periodic conflation of materialism and atheism. When arguing against atheism's capacity to ground moral truths, he constantly appeals to the inability of morals to be grounded in matter. But I don't think atheism is necessarily committed to materialism (although certainly many atheists are materialists). He also tends to assume a libertarian definition of freedom. And while I agree with him, compatibilists will likely think this to be question begging.

When offering an account for why the ground of morality must be God, Jackson attributes many attributes to the explanation. Most of them, I think, are correct. But I'm not sure if he is correct to say that it must be personal. His justification is that the explanation must be able to explain the "oughtness" of morality. But I'm not sure why a Platonic sort of account of moral truths wouldn't suffice here. Admittedly this seems more contrived than theism. But I don't think we can say that it is impossible.

When arguing for the reality of moral truths, Jackson argued that one cannot live without acting as though there is such a thing as objective morality. But I don't think that entails that objective morality is true. Evolution could explain why we are constrained to act in certain ways. Likewise he appeals to the idea that moral beliefs are properly basic and therefore in need of no further justification. But properly basic beliefs still need justification. That justification won't come in the form of other beliefs. But that doesn't make them arbitrary. Towards the end Jackson gives an excellent critique of theories of morality which try to explain it by reference to social conditioning.

Chapter 2 sets the stage for responding to the problem of evil. Jackson carefully lays out the many layers of the problem and briefly explains how he plans to tackle them. The chapter is both clear and helpful.

Chapter 3 introduces the free will defense. Jackson spends a lot of time discussing biblical texts relevant to the nature of free will. Initially this may seem a little out of place, but recalling that the book is specifically presenting a Christian theodicy, I think Jackson's deference to biblical texts is warranted. He gives some criticisms of compatibilist accounts of free will, and proceeds to offer arguments for a libertarian account. Unfortunately I found the biblical sections of the argument to border on proof texting. There was very little discussion about how compatibilists understand the texts Jackson used in support of libertarianism. But I suppose that probably went beyond the purview of the book. I was surprised that there was no mention on 1 Corinthians 10:13 which, in my opinion, is one of the clearest text in favor of libertarian free will. Finally Jackson explores the problem of whether or not there will be free will in heaven. He concludes that there will be, and I found his case to be quite compelling in this regard.

Chapter 4 applies the free will defense to the problem of natural evil. Jackson begins by discussing Lapsarianism, the idea that the fall of man as recorded in Genesis 3 is natural evils can be explained by reference to man's free will. I must admit that I am a little surprised that Jackson had a favorable view of this solution. The most glaring problem facing this idea is that God does not seem justified in removing everyone's immunity to evil on the basis of Adam and Eve having sinned. Why should we all suffer for what others did when this suffering is not a direct result of their sin, but rather a permanent curse on the earth? I don't think Jackson addressed this problem.

Jackson turns to consider Swinburne's suggestion that natural evil is needed in order for people to have knowledge of what is good. Now this is an interesting argument that I haven't fully decided upon. However, Jackson finds it to be fatally flawed since God could intervene and remove evil by means of miracles. I am less impressed by this objection than Jackson is. If we allow that natural evil is necessary in order for people to have knowledge of good and evil, then obviously God won't intervene. The objection seems entirely misplaced to me. Furthermore, Jackson does not appear to appreciate the devastating epistemic consequences that would follow if God did miracles in order to prevent every instance of evil. If miracles were commonplace, they would lose their evidential power and be mistaken for ordinary events. I was also a bit surprised that Jackson did not discuss the possible soteriological benefits that natural evil may bring about in this chapter (although he does in the next). I personally find this possibility intriguing.

Chapter 5 kicks off part two of the book. I think that the most outstanding feature of this chapter is Jackson's defense of consequentialism. I actually thought he made a rather good case that consequentialism is not necessarily a bad thing.

Chapter 6 discusses a theodicy which was entirely new to me, what Jackson calls the Felix Culpa theodicy. According to this theory, the evils in the world were necessary for the history of salvation to unfold and that this history is required for our world to be the best possible world. The chapter contains an excellent argument for an orthodox kenotic model of the incarnation (although Jackson never uses that term). When discussing the atonement, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint which theory of the atonement Jackson holds. Much of what he says sounds like he accepts the penal substitutionary theory (even referencing Craig's book on the topic), but in a later chapter he proceeds to critique penal substitution.

In chapter 7, Jackson moves to explore the problem of animal suffering. I think he is too quick to dismiss Trent Dougherty's solution (although towards the end of the chapter he expresses some sympathy towards a similar solution). When discussing how one's view on biological evolution impacts one's theodicy, Jackson correctly points out that rejection of biological evolution doesn't solve the problem. However, I think he overlooks the fact that rejection of biological evolution does make the task much easier, for now we needn't explain why there were millions of years of (seemingly) pointless suffering.

Jackson ultimately lands on a theodicy according to which evolutionary history complete with suffering illustrates or foreshadows salvation history. I'm not completely satisfied with this account. Imagine a painter who butchers helpless animals so that he can use their blood to paint beautiful pictures. I doubt anyone would say that the beautiful picture justifies the horrifying violence. True, the suffering isn't any longer pointless in the broadest sense of the word. But it still seems unnecessary. I'm hard pressed to see how Jackson's proposal significantly differs from this illustration.

In chapter 8, Jackson builds a case for universalism. However, I didn't find the biblical texts which he utilized to justify this conclusion. For example, he used texts like John 3:16 and 1 Timothy 2:4 which state that God wants everyone to be saved. But it doesn't follow from the fact that God desires that all be saved that all will be saved. Jackson also uses 1 Corinthians 15:22, which says that as in Adam all die even so in Christ will all be made alive. He argues that because the word "all" is parallel in both instances, it must refer to the same group. However that doesn't work if we understand how Paul uses the phrase "in Christ." Paul uses this to refer to the metaphorical location of believers. Christ is a corporate head who stands in contrast to Adam. Thus, we may read Paul as saying that all who are in Adam die just as all who are in Christ will be made alive. Similarly he uses Romans 11:32, where it says that God bound all in disobedience that He might have mercy on all. But contextually this refers to the people of Israel who, as Paul has explained in chapters 9-11, are being judicially hardened by God. Of course the point about God's mercy can be extended to all the world. But notice that Paul says that this was so that God *may have* mercy on all. This appears to be a statement about God making mercy available to all. But it doesn't suggest that all will be recipients of that mercy. Likewise he uses 1 John 2:2. But this verse only affirms that Christ died for the world. It doesn't say that the world will benefit from His death. And again, 1 Timothy 4:10 states that God is the Savior of all men and especially believers. Paul makes an obvious distinction between how God is the Savior of believers and unbelievers. I would suggest that the difference lies in who is actually saved. Philippians 2:10-11 says every knee will bow and every tongue will confess. But the context is about the supremacy of Christ. Paul isn't discussing soteriology. He certainly doesn't say that this confession is voluntary or salvific.

I also found it interesting that a text like Matthew 7:14 which plainly says that the way that leads to life is narrow and only a few find it was not discussed. Additionally Hebrews 6:4-6 which seems to say that apostates can never be saved again received no attention. I understand that this probably went beyond the scope of the book.

I thoroughly enjoyed the diatribe against Calvinism. However, I was disappointed in Jackson's treatment of Arminianism. First, and this is a rather minor quibble, he cites Dave Hunt as a proponent of Arminianism. This is not true. Hunt didn't identify as such and Arminians don't claim him. Moreover he greatly misrepresents Arminius in his books.

The really unfortunate part was Jackson's claim that Arminians don't believe that God is able to save everyone and that they deny God's sovereignty. This is completely false. No Arminian claims that God is unable to unconditionally save everyone if He wanted to. It is precisely because we believe that God desires all to freely meet the condition of faith, that He does not save all. God wants to save all, but not unconditionally. God wants everyone to meet the condition of faith, but will only actually save those who do. God doesn't have to do it this way. He surely could save anyone even those who don't believe. But Scripture doesn't teach this. Scripture reveals that God has chosen to save those who believe and that He wants all to believe.

Jackson concludes that Arminians must believe that God is unable to save a on the basis of the following argument:

1. God desires that all men shall be saved

2. God is omnipotent and has the ability to save everyone

3. Therefore, all people are saved

Overall Jackson's book is quite impressive in terms of discussing a wide range of topics. I think the sections pertinent to the POE were, for the most part, well done. I think that the discussion on tertiary issues like soteriology and eschatology could have been much better. But these were not the main issues that Jackson wanted to write about. Once again, this is not my area of expertise. These are just my honest thoughts as an interested layperson.

He concludes that Arminians must deny premise 2. But that's not the case at all. We would simply point out that the conclusion does not follow unless you add the premise that God unconditionally saves everyone he wants to save. This is the unspoken premise that the Arminian disputes.

Jackson also offers three biblical texts which he thinks challenge Arminianism: John 15:16, 2 Timothy 1:9, and Romans 9:16. In John 15:16, Jesus says that you did not choose me but I chose you. However, as John Calvin himself observed, this text is not about election to salvation but rather the choosing of the disciples to go and bring forth fruit (ie converts). It doesn't negate the fact that election unto salvation requires faith. 2 Timothy 1:9 says that we weren't saved on the basis of works. Arminians agree. We believe that faith, not works, is the condition for election. Finally, Romans 9:16 says that it doesn't depend on him that runs or him that wills. The crucial question, of course, is what does "it" refer to. Arminians have traditionally understood this to refer to the ground of salvation (grace through faith) although many scholars take this to be a simple reference to works of the law. Either way, it doesn't challenge Arminianism.

I also want to address Jackson's repeated claim that Arminians don't believe that God ever overrides human freedom. This is also false. We believe God can and does. We just don't think that He normally does this or that He does this in regard to salvation.

I also need to correct some of Jackson's claims about annihilationism. He claims that annihilationists don't believe in eternal punishment. This is false. Annihilationists do believe in eternal punishment (death) they just don't believe in eternal torment. He also seems to think that annihilationists believe that people are instantly annihilated at death. I am shocked by this claim especially given the sources that Jackson cites as books arguing for annihilationism. Surely if he read these books he knows that very few annihilationists believe that there is no judgment after death. Annihilationists don't dispute the reality of conscience torment, they just dispute the duration of it.

The final chapter of the book ties up some loose ends. Jackson addresses the issues of skeptical theism, divine hiddenness, and religious disagreement. The book ends by walking the reader through the sinner's prayer.

Overall Jackson's book is quite impressive in terms of discussing a wide range of topics. I think the sections pertinent to the POE were, for the most part, well done. I think that the discussion on tertiary issues like soteriology and eschatology could have been much better. But these were not the main issues that Jackson wanted to write about. Once again, this is not my area of expertise. These are just my honest thoughts as an interested layperson.